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COMMENT
Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal
Agriculture is Not Beyond the Scope of
Clean Air Act Regulation
SARAH C. WILSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Air pollution from agriculture is a reasonably new phenome-
non. When the Clean Air Act1 (CAA) was drafted in 1970, legisla-
tors excluded agriculture, since at that time farms could hardly be
considered serious sources of air pollution. The traditional "fam-
ily" farm2-the dominant agricultural model when the CAA
emerged-is relatively small in scale and light on the land, and
not a serious pollution threat. Farming, however, is not what it
once was. While the United States still has a large contingent of
family farmers, this group is quickly diminishing.3 Replacing the
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reflect the views of Pace University or the Pace Environmental Law Review. I would
like to thank my dedicated article editor, Kristen Sentoff, her articles group, and all
Pace Environmental Law Review staff for their help in editing my article. I would
also like to thank the many environmental attorneys and advocates who read, criti-
qued, and fact-checked my article, in particular, my good friend, Kendra Kimbiraus-
kas, who inspired this piece. Finally, thanks to my mother and father, Barbara and
Larry Wilson, for patiently reading my article.
1. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
2. "A family farm is not defined by its size, but rather by the fact that the family
provides the vast majority of the labor and management decisions.... The common
goal of family farmers is farm sustainability-both economically and environmen-
tally." National Family Farm Coalition, What is a Family Farm?, http://
www.nffc.net/what/familyfarm.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
3. See, e.g., Dana L. Jackson, The Farm as Natural Habitat, in THE FARM AS
NATURAL HABITAT: RECONNECTING FOOD SYSTEMS WITH ECOSYSTEMS
13, 15 (Dana L. Jackson & Laura L. Jackson eds., 2002) [hereinafter The Farm as
Natural Habitat] (Between 1992 and 1997 four dairy farmers went out of business
each day); Andrew Kimbrell, Myth Three: Industrial Food is Cheap, in THE FATAL
HARVEST READER: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 15, 17
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family farm is an entirely new breed of farming-industrial agri-
culture-which has become a substantial source of air pollution
across the country. 4
In this "transformation of America from an essentially agra-
rian culture to one that is now almost completely industrialized,"5
virtually no aspect of agriculture has gone untouched. 6 However,
this article's discussion of industrial agriculture focuses only on
livestock, as industrial animal agriculture has become a promi-
nent concern of policy-makers, scientists, and citizens in recent
years. 7 Of particular concern are "animal feeding operations" or
"AFOs," which are enterprises that raise hundreds, thousands,
and in some cases, millions of farm animals in confinement.8 Ap-
proximately 450,000 AFOs are in operation in the United States.9
AFOs that raise particularly large numbers of animals are called
"concentrated animal feeding operations," or "CAFOs."10 Approxi-
(Andrew Kimbrell ed., 2002) [collection hereinafter FATAL HARVEST READER] (Sev-
enty-five years ago there were nearly seven million farmers in America; in 2002 there
were only two million. The United States lost an average of 32,500 farms annually
between 1987 and 1992, most of which were family run.).
4. See Andrew Kimbrell, Seven Deadly Myths of Industrial Agriculture, in FATAL
HARVEST READER, supra note 3, at 3, 3.
5. Douglas Tompkins, Prologue to FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 3, at viii,
viii.
6. See generally FATAL HARVEST READER, supra note 3, at passim.
7. See, e.g., AD Hoc COMM. ON AIR EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERA-
TIONS, COMM. ON ANIMAL NUTRITION, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, ET AL., AIR EMISSIONS
FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, FUTURE NEEDS (2003);
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., AIR QUALITY ISSUES
AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER (2005) [hereinafter COPELAND, PRIMER]; Jenny
Filipy et al., Identification and Quantification of Volatile Organic Compounds from a
Dairy, 40 Atmospheric Env't 1480 (2006).
8. See COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 1 (calling AFOs "enterprises where
animals are raised in confinement"); see also, KEN MIDKIFF, THE MEAT YOU EAT:
HOW CORPORATE FARMING HAS ENDANGERED AMERICA'S FOOD SUPPLY
22 (2004) (referring to the "sheer size" of confinement operations: "5000 cows, 80,000
hogs or 2 million chickens").
9. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): Animal
Feeding Operations Frequently Asked Questions, httpJ/cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/
faqs.cfm?programjid=7 (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter AFO FAQs].
10. The distinction between AFOs and CAFOs is not always made, and often, en-
vironmental groups and agencies will use the term interchangeably. However, the
EPA has promulgated regulations that specify exactly when an AFO will be classified
as a CAFO. See Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2006).
At what point this is differs for every type of animal raised. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23(b)(2), (4), (6). For example, an AFO is a "Medium CAFO" with 200-999 dairy
cows, 750-2499 pigs, or 9000-29,000 chickens. Id. § 122.23(b)(6).
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mately 18,700 AFOs in the United States are classified as
CAFOs. 11
Notwithstanding the numerous problems associated with
AFOs, or "factory-style farms,"1 2 including the displacement of
family farms, the destruction of rural communities, animal wel-
fare concerns, and human health problems, AFOs create substan-
tial air and water pollution.13 Unnaturally high concentrations of
animal excrement sit for months or even years in on-site waste
storage "lagoons."14 The animal waste frequently leaks from
lagoons into groundwater, and when it is applied to the land, runs
off into streams and lakes, harming ecosystems and threatening
human health. 15
Furthermore, decomposing manure in lagoons emits high
levels of pollutants like volatile organic compounds (VOCs), par-
ticulate matter (PM), methane, ozone, ammonia, and hydrogen
sulfide (H2S), which in turn cause a range of devastating health
and environmental impacts, including asthma and other respira-
tory diseases, acid rain, and global warming.16 While Congress
responded to industrial animal agriculture's threat to the nation's
water supply by including an express provision in the Clean
Water Act (CWA) 17 to regulate CAFOs,18 the CAA, includes no
such provision to protect the nation's air quality. 19
Clearly, agriculture has changed. Yet, federal air pollution
laws have not responded. This article examines why the CAA-
11. Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA, Compliance and En-
forcement National Priority: Clean Water Act, Wet Weather, Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations 2 (Oct. 2006), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publica-
tions/data/planning/priorities/fy2005prioritycwacafo.pdf.
12. AFOs and CAFOs are often referred to as factory-farms or factory-style farms.
See, e.g., Kimbrell, supra note 4, at 3. Throughout this article, AFOs are referred to
as factory-style farms.
13. See id. (providing a good overview of the range of problems of industrial
agriculture).
14. See Grace Factory Farm Project, Is Your Meat Fit to Eat?, http:/!
www.factoryfarm.org/whatis/3.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (explaining what a "la-
goon" is); see also MIDKIFF, supra note 8, at 12-13 (explaining the excessive manure in
single-location storage and its unnaturalness).
15. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 1; See Grace Factory Farm Project, supra
note 14 (A lagoon spill killed ten million fish and closed hundreds of thousands of
acres of coastal wetlands shell fishing.).
16. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 2-5.
17. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
18. Id. § 1362(14). The CWA regulates CAFOs under its National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program. See id. § 1342(a).
19. See Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7671q
(2000).
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the primary federal air pollution law-has not been used to react
to this new type of animal agriculture with an effective regulatory
scheme. The article focuses in particular on the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) Air Compliance Agreement, 20 which is
not an effective response to the need to regulate emissions from
factory-style farms, but rather an effort to further delay regula-
tion. This article demonstrates that AFOs are considered indus-
trial sources of pollution elsewhere under the law, and argues that
the CAA should likewise treat AFOs as such. It concludes that
environmental regulators must realize that at some point an agri-
cultural operation shifts from benign farm to polluting industrial
operation, and at that point, must be treated accordingly under
the CAA.
Part II of the article provides background information on the
animal agriculture industry, explaining the reasons for the shift
from the family farm to the factory farm, discussing the adverse
environmental and health impacts of factory-style farms, and ex-
ploring why the government has declined to regulate AFOs under
the CAA. Part III provides background information on the CAA,
including its regulatory framework and its success as a regulatory
tool.
Part IV discusses how AFOs are treated as industrial sources
of pollution elsewhere under the law. Next, Part V discusses the
EPA's Air Compliance Agreement in detail, arguing that it is a
woefully inadequate response to the lack of regulation of AFO air
emissions. Finally, Part VI proposes that a better response would
be to develop a framework for regulation of AFOs under the CAA.
This section proposes regulatory mechanisms that the EPA could
use to begin curbing AFO emissions under the CAA.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FACTORY
FARMING
A. The Shifting Livestock Sector - From Family Farm to
Factory Farm
At the turn of the twentieth century, half of all Americans
were farmers. 21 These early farmers created natural farm man-
20. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Air Compliance Agreement].
21. MIDKIFF, supra note 8, at 2. Contrast this to agriculture at the turn of the
twenty-first century when less than two percent of Americans in 1997 were farmers.
Jackson, supra note 3, at 24.
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agement systems, using livestock and diverse crops to control
pests and return nutrients to the land.22 By the end of World War
II, however, the use of synthetic fertilizers and chemical pesticides
had largely replaced natural farm management systems. 23
Manure was no longer needed to fertilize crops, and livestock and
crops became increasingly separated. 24
Like most of the production of goods in America, farming fur-
ther evolved into an industrialized process. Poultry production
led the way, introducing the first industrialized farming methods
in the 1960s. 25 Hog farms, dairies, and other livestock operations
followed suit.26 Most livestock operations today are not run by
family farmers living on their own farms. The people who run
modern livestock operations often work for agricultural corpora-
tions, or "agribusinesses," with some of the largest including Ty-
son and Smithfield.2 7  Agribusinesses form contracts with
livestock growers; under each contract, the corporation, or "inte-
grator," provides animals, feed, medications, and veterinary care;
and the grower manages the animals. 28 This type of livestock pro-
duction is called "vertical integration," and has become the domi-
nant corporate structure for livestock production.29
B. Animal Feeding Operations Described
The AFO, described in Part I, is the chosen model of the verti-
cally integrated livestock operation.30 The EPA describes AFOs
as "agricultural enterprises where animals are kept and raised in
confined situations. AFOs congregate animals, feed, manure and
22. Brian A. DeVore, Nature's Backlash, in THE FARM AS NATURAL HABITAT, supra
note 3, at 27, 33 ("For example, a farmer would raise cattle on hay, oats, corn, and
pasture. The manure from those cattle went back to the land that produced the feed,
and the cycle started over again.").
23. See id. (Farmers found that fertilizers and chemical pesticides made rotation
farming "superfluous.").
24. Id.
25. Christopher B. Connard, Comment, Sustaining Agriculture: An Examination
of Current Legislation Promoting Sustainable Agriculture as an Alternative to Con-
ventional Farming Practices, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004).
26. Id.
27. Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environ-
mental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 797, 803 (2005).
28. Id. at 805. Medications administered to confined animals include routine
doses of antibiotics, which are outside the scope of this article, but are another serious
health threat stemming from industrial animal agriculture.
29. See generally id. at 804-11 for a discussion of vertical integration.
30. Id. at 809.
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urine, dead animals, and production operations on a small land
area. Feed is brought to the animals rather than the animals
grazing or otherwise seeking feed in pastures, fields, or on range-
land."31 AFOs confine animals in anywhere from three to thirty
buildings; the animals are kept in cages on slatted cement floors
which allows waste to fall into holding areas beneath. 32 Animal
waste is abundant in these types of operations; one cow produces
the same amount of waste that twenty-three people create,33 and
a CAFO with 500,000 hogs produces 6.5 million pounds of waste
per day, or as much as a city the size of Philadelphia. 34 Because it
can be difficult for the land to absorb such high concentrations of
animal waste, the waste on AFOs is instead pumped into waste
storage "lagoons," some of which can be as large as eight acres. 35
Waste is stored in lagoons until land becomes available on which
to spread the waste. 36
C. The Link Between Factory Farming and Air Quality
Impacts
Livestock farms have always caused some degree of air pollu-
tion-pigs smell, there is no doubt. While animal farms have tra-
ditionally been considered to create mere annoyances, today's
AFOs create serious environmental and health threats.37 The
breakdown of animal waste creates numerous harmful pollutants,
including ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrogen sulfide
(H2S), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and particulate matter
(PM).38 These pollutants are emitted from "barns, feedlot sur-
faces, manure storage and treatment units . . . but air emissions
31. AFO FAQs, supra note 9. EPA regulations define an AFO as:
[A] lot or facility (other than an aquatic animal production facility) where the follow-
ing conditions are met:
(i) Animals (other than aquatic animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined
and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period, and
(ii) Crops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the
normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1).
32. Brehm, supra note 27, at 808-09.
33. See Scott Jerger, EPA's New CAFO Land Application Requirements: An Exer-
cise in Unsupervised Self-Monitoring, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 94 (2004).
34. Brehm, supra note 27, at 811.
35. See Grace Factory Farm Project, supra note 14 (discussing a 1995 waste spill
from an eight-acre lagoon).
36. Brehm, supra note 27, at 809.
37. See id. at 812-14.
38. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 2-5. VOCs and PM are both criteria pol-
lutants under the CAA. See discussion infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 24444
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss2/5
2007] CLEAN AIR ACT REGULATION 445
come mostly from the microbial breakdown of manure stored in
pits or lagoons and spread on fields."39
1. The Pollutants
a. Ammonia
Ammonia is the most prolific air pollutant from animal agri-
culture, and like most AFO pollutants, comes from the breakdown
of animal waste.40 Nitrogen in manure is converted to ammonia,
which escapes from waste lagoons and combines with other ele-
ments to form ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulfate.41 Am-
monia is then re-deposited through rainfall into lakes and
streams, adding to oxygen depletion, excessive algae growth, and
acidification of the environment. 42 Ammonia from animal waste
accounts for an estimated half of the total natural and human-
induced ammonia emissions each year in the United States.43
Health effects from this pollutant include chronic bronchitis,
asthma, other respiratory ailments, and at high levels, may cause
death. 44 Farmworkers and neighboring residents are particularly
affected. 45
b. Particulate Matter, Volatile Organic
Compounds, and Hydrogen Sulfide
PM refers to airborne particular matter that is, for regulatory
purposes, either less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5) or less than 10 mi-
crons (PM10) in diameter. 46 PM10 affects the respiratory tract,
while PM2.5 affects both the respiratory tract and contributes to
regional haze.47 VOCs likewise harm human health, irritating
39. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 2.
40. Id. at 2-3, 5.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Brehm, supra note 27, at 814.
45. A North Carolina study showed that that people living close to hog CAFOs
suffered disproportionate levels of tension, anger, confusion, fatigue, depression, and
lack of overall vigor, as well as more upper respiratory and gastrointestinal ailments
than neighbors of other types of farms and non-livestock areas. An Iowa study
showed both neighbors of hog CAFOs and CAFO workers suffering from similar ail-
ments such as bronchitis, asthma, flu-like illnesses, and upper-air inflammation.
Twenty-five percent of workers at hog CAFOs suffer from chronic health problems
like bronchitis. Sierra Club, Clean Water and Factory Farms: Reports and Fact-
sheets: Air Pollution from Factory Farms, http://www.sierraclub.orgfactoryfarms/
factsheets/air.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
46. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 3.
47. Id. at 4.
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the skin, eyes, nose, and throat, and the environment, forming
PM2.5 and ozone (smog).48 Hydrogen sulfide also causes respira-
tory and cardiovascular irritation, headaches, and in high concen-
trations, brain damage or death.49 The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, for example, reported some CAFOs emitting
levels of hydrogen sulfide that exceeded state standards by up to
fifty times.5 0 The pollutant is also far-reaching, having been
found in the air at unsafe levels nearly five miles from its source. 51
c. Methane and Nitrous Oxide
Methane and nitrous oxide are two other common by-products
of industrial animal agriculture which are known contributors to
global warming.52 Methane is emitted directly from ruminant an-
imals and from the microbial breakdown of manure. 53 According
to the EPA, twenty-five percent of methane emissions in the
United States come from livestock. 54 Nitrous oxide also stems
from waste decomposition, which accounts for six percent of ni-
trous oxide emissions nationwide. 55
2. California Illustrates Factory Farming's Effects on
Air Quality
California offers a particularly grave illustration of how fac-
tory-style farming harms air quality. California is home to 76,500
farms,56 and is the biggest farm economy in the United States. 57
48. Id.
49. Id.; Natural Res. Def. Council, Facts about Pollution from Livestock Farms,
http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/ffarms.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) ("In 1998,
the National Institute of Health reported that 19 people died as a result of hydrogen
sulfide emissions from manure pits.").
50. J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 292 n.171 (2000).
51. Sierra Club, Clean Water: That Stinks, http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanwater/
that stinks/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2007). Similarly, "[c]hildren at a day care center in
Minnesota experienced diarrhea, nausea and headaches due to hydrogen sulfide
poisoning caused by air emissions from a factory farm over a mile away." Id.
52. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Nat'l Agric. Statistics Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., California State Agriculture
Overview - 2005, http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics-by-State/Ag-Overview/
AgOverviewCA.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2007).
57. Legislative Analyst's Office, 2002 Cal Facts Economy (Dec.2002), http:l/
www.lao.ca.gov/2002/calfacts/econ.html. In 2002, California's market value of pro-
duction was $25,737,173,000, with livestock sales accounting for $6,584,451,000.
CAL. AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2002 CENSUS OF AGRICUL-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss2/5
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The San Joaquin Valley, home to two-thirds of the state's dair-
ies,58 may look like "a bucolic farming community, complete with
almond groves, cornfields and orange trees" from afar.59 However,
a closer inspection reveals that this area between the Sierra Ne-
vada and the Coastal Ranges is actually a smog-filled haven for
respiratory disease. 60 Over sixteen percent of the region's chil-
dren have asthma, which is triple the national rate.61 The City of
Fresno has the third-highest rate of asthma in the country,62 and
only Houston and Los Angeles can rival the San Joaquin Valley
for having the country's worst air quality.63 This elevated level of
pollution has caused many of California's air quality districts to be
designated "non-attainment zones" 64 under the CAA. The San
Joaquin Valley, for example, was reclassified in 2001 as a severe
non-attainment zone.65 The source of over half of the San Joaquin
Valley's pollution in autumn is industrial agriculture, which con-
tributes 170 tons of emissions per day.66
D. Despite AFOs' Impacts on Air Quality, the
Government Has Not Responded
Despite the known impacts of industrial animal agriculture
on air quality, the federal and state governments have not yet ad-
equately addressed the problem. State and federal laws either ex-
pressly exempt agriculture from air pollution laws, or simply
neglect to include agriculture as a regulated industry. Further-
more, the failure to regulate agriculture is not just limited to air
TURE STATE PROFILE: CALIFORNIA - RANKED ITEMS WITHIN U.S., available at http:/!
www.nass.usda.gov/StatisticsbyState/Ag-Overview/AgOverview-CA.pdf.
58. Ruhl, supra note 50, at 286.
59. Juliet Eilperin, In California, Agriculture Takes Center Stage in Pollution De-
bate, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al.
60. Id.
61. David A. Yengoyan, Comment, Title V of the Clean Air Act: The Effects of Cali-
fornia's Agricultural Exemption on the San Joaquin Valley, 1 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIc. L.
REV. 151, 151 (2003).
62. Eilperin, supra note 59, at Al.
63. Id.
64. The EPA classifies "air quality control regions" within each state as either
"nonattainment," "attainment," or "unclassifiable." Nonattainment areas are areas
that do not meet the standard for a particular national air quality standard, while
attainment areas are areas that do meet the standards. 42 U.S.C. 42
§ 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
65. Yengoyan, supra note 61, at 156. Classifications for ozone non-attainment
zones include, from best to worst: marginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme.
42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1).
66. S. 700, 2003 Leg., 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
20071 447
9
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
pollution. State and federal laws also exclude agriculture from
other types of laws.
1. Shielding Agriculture from Air Pollution
Regulation
a. State Laws - Oregon and California as
Examples
Oregon's air pollution laws expressly exempt agriculture from
regulation, stating: "[T]he air pollution laws contained in [air pol-
lution control provisions] do not apply to: (a) Agricultural opera-
tions and the growing or harvesting of crops and the raising of
fowl or animals ... "67 California had a similar provision until the
California Legislature repealed it in 2003.68 California Health
and Safety Code formerly provided, "a permit shall not be re-
quired for... (e) any equipment used in agricultural operations in
the growing of crops or the raising of fowl or animals .... -69
b. Federal laws - the CAA as an Example
Federal laws also expressly exempt agriculture from air pollu-
tion regulation. The CAA's section governing the regulation of
hazardous pollutants, for example, includes a requirement for the
EPA Administrator to promulgate a list of one hundred sub-
stances which are "known to cause or may be reasonably antici-
pated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse affects to human
health or the environment" upon accidental release. 70 However,
the Administrator also has the authority to "establish a greater
threshold quantity for, or to exempt entirely, any substance that
is a nutrient used in agriculture when held by a farmer."71 Fur-
thermore, under the CAA's section governing state standards of
fleet vehicles and engines, the Act prohibits states from enforcing
standards or other emissions-controlling requirements for engines
used in farm equipment.72
67. OR. REV. STAT. § 468A.020 (2005).
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42310(e) (Deering 2003) (repealed 2003).
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3).
71. Id. § 7214(r)(5).
72. Id. § 7581(5). It should be noted that the CAA arguably contains provisions
that do apply to agriculture, otherwise the EPA would have been unable to prevail in
the few cases it has brought against AFOs under the CAA. See discussion infra Part
IV. However, the fact remains that the federal government generally declines to use
this authority.
448 [Vol. 24
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2. Shielding Agriculture from Other Types of
Regulation
a. Right-to-Farm Laws
In addition to shielding agriculture from air pollution laws, a
range of other laws exist that protect agriculture from common
law tort claims. Many states, for example, have what are called
"Right-to-Farm" laws. 73 These laws protect farmers from nui-
sance and trespass suits, as long as the farm practices are "rea-
sonable and prudent."74 For example, if a new non-farm neighbor
moves next door to a pig farm, the farm is shielded from any nui-
sance action the neighbor many bring regarding the pig smell. In
the 1980s, the Right-to-Farm law became a popular tool for pro-
tecting farmland from encroaching urbanization. 75 AFO operators
are able to use Right-to-Farm laws to their advantage, character-
izing themselves as farms to gain immunity from tort claims. 76
b. Agriculture & Markets Law
Similarly, some state laws shield farms from local laws that
have the potential to hinder farming operations. New York's De-
partment of Agriculture and Markets, for example, exists to "fos-
ter a competitive food and agriculture industry that benefits
producers and consumers alike."77 The department has a compre-
hensive set of laws through which it carries out its marketing
goals.78 One such law states that "[l]ocal governments, when ex-
ercising their powers to enact and administer comprehensive
73. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 308 (McKinney 2006). For a good discus-
sion on Right-to-Farm law, see Lisa M. Thomas, Comment, Forgiving Nuisance and
Trespass: Is Oregon's Right-to-Farm Law Constitutional?, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
445 (2001).
74. Thomas, supra note 73, at 445.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Pure Air & Water, Inc. v. Davidsen, 668 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div.
1998) (allowing New York's Right-to-Farm law to bar a nuisance action against a
farm operation with 1000 pigs); see also Upchurch v. Cumberland County Fiscal
Court, No. 2000-CA-002607-MR, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 22, at *3 (Ct. App. 2003)
(Schroder, J., dissenting) (noting the ridiculousness of allowing the Right-to-Farm law
to be applied to AFOs: "We can all agree that 23 chickens in a coop would be a tradi-
tional agricultural or farm use. Likewise, 23,000 chickens in a barn is more of a
chicken factory or AFO. An AFO is not subject to city or county regulations because of
the Right to Farm Act.").
77. N.Y. State Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., Welcome!, http://www.agmkt.state. ny.us/
TheDepartment.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
78. See New York State Legislature, http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi
(click on "Laws of New York," click on "AGM") (listing New York's laws pertaining to
agriculture and markets) (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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plans and local laws, ordinances, rules or regulations ... shall not
unreasonably restrict or regulate farm operations within agricul-
tural districts ... unless it can be shown that the public health or
safety is threatened."79 While this provision is a positive way to
keep land in agricultural production, it also has the negative effect
of prohibiting municipalities from drafting laws to protect people
from some dangers AFOs pose.80
c. The CWA Stormwater Exemption
Additionally, even though the CWA regulates CAFOs (the big-
ger AFOs) under its NPDES permit program, 8 ' the CWA still in-
cludes a substantial exemption for animal agriculture.
"Agricultural stormwater discharges" from farmlands are not con-
sidered discharges for purposes of the CWA.82 Considering that it
is during storms when much of the runoff from farms occurs (in-
cluding manure that is sprayed on fields), the stormwater exemp-
tion effectively forms a shield from CWA regulation for
agriculture.8 3
E. Why the Government Has Failed to Respond to
Factory Farming's Air Quality Threat
While many of these laws were justified in the era before in-
dustrial agriculture, AFOs are now able to take advantage of laws
designed to help smaller, less polluting farms. These laws frus-
trate the protection of the public interest, which is often damaged
by factory-style farming practices. 84 Why has the government
failed to respond to the lack of air pollution regulation in the face
of this new type of agriculture? As shown above, the government
has historically graced agriculture with special treatment, ex-
pressly exempting the industry or simply not addressing it at
79. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305-a(1).
80. See, e.g., Order for Town of Butternut, Compelling Compliance with the Provi-
sions of Sections 305(2) and 305-a(1) of the Agriculture and Markets Law (N.Y. Dep't
of Agric. & Mkts. June 18, 1997) (determination and order) (concluding that town's
law prohibiting dairy from landspreading waste unreasonably restricts farming
operation).
81. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), 1362(14).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). The Water Quality Act of 1987 made this amend-
ment. See Jerger, supra note 33, at 103.
83. For a criticism of the CWA's agricultural stormwater exemption, which was
further amended to be less strict in 2003 see generally Jerger, supra note 33, at 102-
05.
84. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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all.8 5 Also, the sheer number of farms makes regulation daunt-
ing.8 6 Adding to the difficulty is the dispersal of farms across the
country, especially in rural areas.8 7 Furthermore, farms lack
"point sources" such as smokestacks and pipes, which other indus-
trial sources possess, making monitoring and measuring emis-
sions troublesome.88
There are also economic, political, and social considerations.
Agriculture is a $200 billion industry nationally, making it an im-
portant part of the United States economy.8 9 Also, agriculture has
historically been a strong political force, and has successfully
evaded regulation through extensive congressional lobbying.90
Moreover, Americans still kindle a romanticized view of agricul-
ture, imagining their food coming from pastoral farms with red
barns amid green, rolling pastures.91 Although this "Jeffersonian
ideal"92 is an inaccurate view of modern agriculture, powerful
agribusinesses sustain this falsehood through marketing cam-
paigns with imagery of small farms and happy cows, when in real-
ity their products are frequently from confinement operations. 93
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CLEAN
AIR ACT
As Part II discussed, the government has continuously re-
frained from regulating agriculture. Regarding air pollution, only
three times has the EPA brought enforcement actions against
AFOs under the CAA. 94 Before making the argument that the
85. COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 7, at Summary.
86. Ruhl, supra note 50, at 329.
87. Id.
88. See Farm Foundation, The Future of Animal Agriculture in North America:
An Overview of Issues 5 (Nov. 2004), http://www.farmfoundation.org/projects/docu-
ments/InitialWhitePaperNovemberO4.pdf.
89. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2002 CENSUS OF AGRI-
CULTURE - UNITED STATES DATA 9, tbl.3, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/cen-
sus/census02/volumel/usfUSVolumelO4.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 50, at 332 ("The Farm Bureau has fought stead-
fastly, and apparently quite successfully, against any and all proposed environmental
regulation of farms."); see also Industry Seeks to Define Farm Emission Sources to
Limit Enforcement, INSIDE EPA, July 15, 2005, at 9 (describing how an agricultural
industry task force proposed new definitions to limit the ability of environmental laws
to regulate agriculture).
91. Connard, supra note 25, at 134; Brehm, supra note 27, at 797-98.
92. Brehm, supra note 27, at 798.
93. See id.; see also Kimbrell, supra note 4, at 3 ("Corporate agriculture has
flooded, and continues to inundate, the public with self-serving myths about modern
food production.").
94. See discussion infra Part IV.
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government should regulate air pollution from AFOs under the
CAA, it is important to understand how the CAA actually works.
To that end, this section gives the reader a basic understanding of
how the CAA works, and explains how the Act has been an effec-
tive regulatory tool for other industries.
A. The Overall Framework
The CAA, the United States' primary air pollution law, has
existed in some form since the 1950s.95 Congress passed the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955,96 which was little more than an au-
thorization to allocate money for federal research into air pollu-
tion control and provide assistance to the states. 97 In 1963,
Congress passed a new act, which was given its modern name, the
"Clean Air Act."9 8 The Air Quality Act of 196799 amended the
Clean Air Act to provide for federal regulation of sources of air
pollution for the first time. 100 It was not until 1970, however, that
the CAA appeared in its modern form. 10 1 Congress, at that point,
authorized the EPA (a brand new agency at the time) to imple-
ment and enforce the Act. 10 2
One of the main purposes of the CAA is "to protect and en-
hance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of the popu-
lation."'10 3 The EPA has been relatively successful in carrying out
this purpose. To illustrate, even though the nation's energy con-
sumption has increased 47% percent in the past thirty years, the
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (an indicator of consumption) has in-
creased 187% and the number of vehicle miles traveled has in-
creased 171%, air pollution has been reduced by half since
95. Roy S. BELDEN, CLEAN AIR ACT 5 (2001).
96. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
97. BELDEN, supra note 95, at 5.
98. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
99. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
100. BELDEN, supra note 95, at 5.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
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1970.104 This drop in air pollution has occurred mainly through
the CAA's regulation of sources like power plants and factories.10 5
The CAA is "one of the most complicated and prescriptive en-
vironmental statutes on the books,"1 0 6 perhaps in part due to its
federal-state partnership. The Act contains a dual regulatory re-
gime in which the federal government sets national air quality
standards called National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 10 7 or
"NAAQS," and the states create plans called State Implementa-
tion Plans, 08 or "SIPs," in order to ensure that the standards are
met. Included in SIPs are requirements for sources to obtain per-
mits in order to emit pollution. 10 9
B. National Air Quality Standards as the Goal
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are the
EPA standards intended to reflect an acceptable level of pollu-
tion-in other words, one that ensures that people will be healthy
and the environment will not be degraded. NAAQS are divided
into two categories: primary and secondary. 1 0 Primary standards
are "requisite to protect the public health;""' secondary standards
are designed to "protect the public welfare.., from adverse affects
... of ... air pollutant[s]". 1 12 The EPA is required to list pollu-
tants that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 1 3 These are called "criteria pollutants," and
the EPA has so far identified six: carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb),
nitrogen dioxide (N02), ozone (03), particulate matter (PM), and
104. Clear Skies Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Air Quality of the
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Jeffrey Holm-
stead, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
105. See EPA, The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act: Features of the 1990
Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaa02.html#topic2a (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2007) (discussing its "breakthrough" permit program).
106. BELDEN, supra note 95, at 5.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
108. Id. § 7410.
109. See id. § 7410(a)(2)(A), (C) (requiring enforceable emissions limitations and a
program for enforcement including source permits). It should be noted that not all
CAA programs are a joint effort between the federal government and the states. The
Act's provisions regulating hazardous air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, and acid depo-
sition, 42 U.S.C. § 7651-76510, for example, are solely the province of the federal
government.
110. Id. § 7409(a).
111. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
112. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
113. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
2007] 453
15
454 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
sulfur dioxide (SO2). 114 The EPA measures whether different re-
gions of the country, called "Air Quality Control Regions," or
"AQCRs," meet NAAQS for each criteria pollutant. 115 AQCRs
that meet NAAQS are called "attainment zones," 116 while AQCRs
that are not are called "non-attainment zones." 117
C. State Implementation Plans
As noted above, the EPA requires each state to develop a SIP
that includes "source-specific emission limitations and other regu-
latory restrictions and control strategies for criteria pollutant
emissions."' 18 The SIP is hardly a federally standardized plan,
however. It functions through a collection of various state stat-
utes, rules, local ordinances, and other measures to control air pol-
lution."1 9 Although states have great flexibility in creating SIPs,
the plans must still contain a number of specific elements as out-
lined in the CAA, 120 and must obtain EPA approval.' 2 ' Also, the
EPA may require revisions to inadequate SIPs,122 a process called
a "SIP call." States that fail to revise inadequate SIPs may be
faced with sanctions such as the loss of highway funding' 23-
something no state can afford to lose-or the requirement to offset
emissions.124
D. Permits - The CAA's Main Regulatory Mechanism
The CAA's primary mechanism for ensuring compliance with
the CAA is the permit. 25 The CAA has two principal permitting
programs: New Source Review (NSR) 26 and Title V Operating
114. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40
C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.12 (2006).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7407.
116. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii).
117. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i).
118. BELDEN, supra note 95, at 23.
119. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).
121. Id. § 7410(k)(3).
122. Id. § 7410(k)(5).
123. Id. § 7509(a), (b)(1)(A).
124. Id. § 7509(a), (b)(2). The Offset sanction requires a state to maintain a ration
of 2:1 for emissions reductions to increased emissions. Id. § 7509(b)(2). This can be
powerful tool as well since it could limit industrial growth in the sanctioned state.
125. Once sources have permits, the EPA can enforce permit conditions through
instruments such as notices of violation (NOVs), administrative orders, and district
court complaints, all authorized by CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
126. NSR requirements, which can be found at Part C and Part D of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7470-7515, differ based on whether the source is in an attainment or non-
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Permits (Title V).127 The NSR program requires new sources and
existing sources undergoing major modifications to submit to a re-
view process before construction. 128 Where sources are located in
non-attainment areas, NSR requires sources to implement "the
most protective pollution controls" and obtain "emission off-
sets."' 29 The Title V program requires existing sources to obtain
operating permits, which contain emission limits, standards, and
controls, plus monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting
requirements. 13o
E. "Major Sources" of Pollution
The permit programs described above apply to "major
sources." 131 The CAA defines major sources differently, depend-
ing on the type of permit applicable to the source, what type of
pollution the source emits, and in which type of zone the source is
located. For example, a source will be subject to NSR if it belongs
to one of the twenty-seven source categories listed in the CAA and
annually emits, or has the "potential to emit," one-hundred tons or
more of any pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA. 132
Sources not listed therein are subject to NSR if they emit or have
the potential to emit more than 250 tons of pollutants annually. 133
A source will be subject to Title V if it either emits (or has the
potential to emit) a hundred tons per year of any pollutant regu-
lated under the CAA, or in the case of hazardous pollutants, ten
tons per year of a single pollutant, or twenty-five tons per year of a
combination of pollutants.134
IV. AFOS ARE MAJOR SOUCES OF INDUSTRIAL
AIR POLLUTION
Although agricultural industry representatives oppose classi-
fying farms with industrial polluters,135 factory-style farms are
attainment area. For a better understanding of the NSR program, see EPA, New
Source Review (NSR), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f. For a better understanding of the Title V program,
see EPA, Air Permits: Basic Facts, http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/ permits/ (last visited
Jan. 23, 2007).
128. BELDEN, supra note 95, at 43.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 97.
131. See 42 U.S.C § 7661 (defining terms as used in Title V).
132. Id. § 7479(1).
133. Id.
134. See id. §§ 7661(2), 7412, 7602(j).
135. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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major sources of industrial air pollution and should be regulated
under the CAA. First, ample proof exists that AFOs emit levels of
pollution on par with many industries. Second, other environmen-
tal laws treat AFOs like industrial sources. Third, lawmakers in
western states, where factory-style farming is causing serious air
pollution problems, have recently required that AFOs be regu-
lated like other industrial sources are under the CAA.
A. AFOs Emit Levels of Air Pollution on Par with
Polluting Industries
As discussed, AFOs produce a variety of toxic emissions 136
and numerous reports document these dangers. 137 AFO emissions
are often comparable with those that traditional manufacturing
plants produce. One dramatic example is Threemile Canyon
Farms, LLC (Threemile) in eastern Oregon. 38 The dairy's 52,300
cows produce up to 15,500 pounds of ammonia daily,' 39 or
5,675,500 pounds annually. At this rate, Threemile's ammonia
emissions are 75,000 pounds greater than the nation's top manu-
facturing source of ammonia air pollution in the United States. 40
B. Other Environmental Laws Treat Factory-Style
Farms like Industry
1. The CWA Treats CAFOs like Industrial Sources
Not only does the science demonstrate the dangers from AFO
emissions, but legislators creating environmental laws and judges
interpreting them also recognize these dangers. As discussed, the
CWA stands alone as the one federal environmental statute that
expressly regulates factory-style farming.' 41 The CWA's express
purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
136. See discussion supra Part II.C.
137. See sources cited supra note 7.
138. See generally Threemile Canyon Farms, LLC, Fact Sheet, http://
www.threemilecanyonfarms.com/ournews/fact sheet.html (last visited Apr. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Threemile Websitel (describing Threemile's operations).
139. Letter and enclosed report from Tom Lindley, Perkins Coie, to EPA Region 10
(Apr. 18, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Threemile Report].
140. See EPA, TRI Explorer: Facility Report, http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/facil-
ity.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter TRI Explorer] (under "Chemical Re-
leased" selection box, select "Select Specific Chemical(s)"; in new window, choose
"Ammonia" and click "Done"; then click "Generate Report" button on original web
page). The top reported ammonia emitter in the United States in 2004 was CFC In-
dustries, Inc. in Donaldsonville, LA. See id.
141. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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biological integrity of the Nation's waters."142 Much like the CAA,
the CWA's regulatory framework includes a process for setting
standards and mechanisms to meet these standards. As the CAA
requires major sources to obtain permits to emit pollutants into
the air, the CWA requires point sources to obtain permits to dis-
charge pollution into the water. 143 The CWA regulates approxi-
mately 85,000 industrial point sources.144
The CWA focuses on the regulation of industrial sources of
pollution. Interestingly, the CWA also regulates CAFOs. In fact,
the CWA goes so far as to use CAFOs in the very definition of a
point source: "The term 'point source' means any discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged."1 45 Clearly, the CWA treats CAFOs as industrial
point sources of pollution. This is a point that cannot be empha-
sized enough in arguing that AFOs are not farms, but industrial
sources of pollution.
2. Courts Have Held That Factory Farms Are Subject
to Superfund Law
Another statute that traditionally regulates industries has
been held to apply to AFOs. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),146 com-
monly referred to as "Superfund," is a remedial statute designed
to hold industrial polluters accountable for the cost of cleaning up
their polluted sites.147 CERCLA regulates sites including refin-
eries, landfills, chemical producers, air force bases, and sanitation
companies, among others.1 48 Industrial sources that emit hazard-
ous substances listed under CERCLA are required to pay into a
trust fund (hence, the moniker "Superfund"), which is then used to
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
143. See id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1).
144. EPA, Civil Enforcement: CWA National Enforcement Programs, http:/!
www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/cwa/cwaenfprog.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
145. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (empha-
sis added).
146. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
147. See EPA, Superfund: CERCLA Overview, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ ac-
tion/law/cercla.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) [hereinafter CERCLA Overview].
148. See EPA, National Priority List: National Priority List Sites in New York,
http://www.epa.gov/superfumd/sites/npl/ny.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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remediate polluted sites.149 Facilities that emit over certain quan-
tities of listed substances are also required to report their emis-
sions to the National Response Center. 150
CERCLA does not expressly regulate AFOs. However, a
trend has emerged in which courts are holding that factory-style
farms do in fact emit hazardous substances and are therefore re-
quired to report emissions and contribute to Superfund. In Sierra
Club v. Seaboard Farms,15 1 for example, the Tenth Circuit ex-
amined whether Dorman Farms, a CAFO owned by Seaboard and
housing 25,000 swine, was responsible for reporting ammonia
emissions from the operation's waste management system (waste
lagoons, barn exhaust system, and land application areas). 52
While in the lower court the Sierra Club lost the argument that
the operation was required to report its ammonia emissions, the
Sierra Club's argument prevailed in the Tenth Circuit, which re-
versed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 53
Similarly, in City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods,54 the City of Tulsa
and Tulsa Metropolitan Utility Authority filed suit against several
poultry companies, including Tyson, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Peter-
son Farms, Inc., whose contract growers in the Eucha/Spavinaw
Watershed had caused eutrophication1 55 of Tulsa area lakes. 15 6
At issue was whether phosphorus emissions from the growers'
poultry litter were a hazardous substance under CERCLA.157 The
district court ultimately held that they did trigger CERCLA
liability.158
In another case involving phosphorus emissions, Waco v.
Schouten,159 the city of Waco, Texas brought a lawsuit against
eight dairies to compel the dairies to contribute to the costs of
149. CERCLA Overview, supra note 146.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
151. Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2004).
152. Id. at 1168-69.
153. Id.
154. City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
155. "Eutrophication is a condition in an aquatic ecosystem where high nutrient
concentrations stimulate blooms of algae .... " EPA, Mid-Atlantic Integrated Assess-
ment: Eutrophication, http://www.epa.gov/maia/html/eutroph.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2007).
156. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
157. Id. at 1283.
158. Id. at 1285.
159. City of Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
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treating water contaminated with phosphorus. 160 The defendant
dairies and their operators brought a motion to dismiss, arguing
that cow manure and other materials that contain phosphorus are
not hazardous substances under CERCLA. 161 The court denied
the dairies' motion, to dismiss, concluding that phosphorus con-
tained in cow manure is a hazardous substance under
CERCLA.162
The fact that federal courts agree that AFOs are liable under
Superfund law is another strong indicator that factory-style farms
are industrial sources of pollution, no less polluting than many
Superfund contributors.
C. Lawmakers in Western States Have Realized the Air
Pollution Threats of Factory Farms, and Are Now
Treating Them as Industrial Sources
1. The California Legislature Removed the
Exemption from Air Pollution Laws for
Agriculture
Yet another strong indicator that factory-style farms are in-
dustrial sources of pollution can be found in California. Although
most people think of the Midwest as farm country, California has
the United States' largest farm economy.' 63 California also has
the country's worst air pollution. 164 While much of the pollution
stems from vehicle emissions, animal agriculture is gaining as a
top pollution source.' 65 California has taken significant steps to
curb auto emissions, including creating the toughest vehicle emis-
sions regulations in the world.' 66 Until recently, however, the
state had neglected to address agricultural emissions.
a. California's Agricultural Exemption in its Air
Pollution Laws
In 2003, the California legislature finally gave agricultural
emissions a hard look and overturned its long-standing policy of
160. Id. at 598.
161. Id. at 601.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying note 57.
164. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
165. See Eilperin, supra note 59, at Al ("By spewing smog-forming gases into the
air, the legislature declared, cows had joined cars and trucks as major polluters.").
166. California Approves World's Toughest Vehicle Emissions Rules, USA TODAY,
Sept. 25, 2004, at Nation, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-09-
25-calif-rulex.htm.
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exempting agriculture from air pollution laws. 167 As discussed in
Part II, California's Health and Safety Code included an exemp-
tion from air pollution laws for agriculture. When the law was
codified in the 1970s, few factory-style farms operated in Califor-
nia, and an agricultural exemption may well have been justi-
fied. 168 In the twenty-first century, however, it is not. California's
air quality is so poor that the EPA has designated some of the
state's air quality districts as extreme non-attainment zones. 169
b. Environmentalists and Citizens Petitioned the
EPA to Remove the Exemption
California's thirty-four pollution control districts run Title V
operating permit programs, 170 which require major sources to ob-
tain Title V permits. 171 In 1996 the EPA determined that the San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District (the San
Joaquin District) operating permit program "substantially, but
not fully" met CAA requirements, and the EPA gave it only in-
terim approval. 172 San Joaquin District responded by revising
some of its programs, and in 2001, the EPA proposed full approval
of its operating program.173
A coalition of citizen and environmental groups expressed
concerns with the Title V program, requesting that the EPA con-
tinue to withhold full approval because the program illegally ex-
empted major sources. 174  The groups argued that AFOs,
167. See supra text accompanying note 68.
168. In 1972, for example, more than half of California's dairy farms had fewer
than 200 cows. See William Salas, Applied Geosolutions, LLC, et al., Biogeochemical
Process-Based Modeling of Nutrients and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from California
Dairies, Presentation at the Dairy Emissions Research Symposium (Oct. 11, 2006).
To be classified a CAFO, a dairy operation must raise 200 or more cows. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
169. See text accompanying note 65; see also Welcome to California, Governor
Launches California Partnership for San Joaquin Valley (June 24, 2005), http://www.
governor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov-htmldisplay.jsp?sFilePath=/govsit/spotlight/0624
05_update.html&sCatTitle&.
170. Proposed Partial Withdrawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Title V Operat-
ing Permits Programs and Implementation of a Partial Part 71 Federal Operating
Permits Program in California, 67 Fed. Reg. 48426, 48426-27 (proposed July 24, 2002)
[hereinafter Proposed Partial Withdrawal].
171. Clean Air Act Full Approval of Operating Permit Program; San Joaquin Val-
ley Unified Air Pollution Control District, California, 66 Fed. Reg. 53151, 53151 (pro-
posed Oct. 19, 2001) [hereinafter CAA Full Approval].
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Letter from Brent J. Newell, Staff Attorney, Ctr. on Race, Poverty & the
Env't, to Gerardo Rios, EPA Region IX, (Nov.16, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
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particularly dairies, are major sources, and that the San Joaquin
District must therefore require existing operations to obtain Title
V permits to operate. 175 Of course the District, like all other pollu-
tion control districts in the state, was not authorized to require
AFOs to obtain Title V permits due to the Section 43210 prohibi-
tion. 176 The coalition urged the EPA to require California to re-
move the exemption from the California Code before approving
the state's Title V programs. 177 The EPA responded by saying
that the exemption applied only to "limited" agricultural types
and that it was "appropriate to defer permitting for this limited
category of agricultural sources because the currently available
techniques for determining emissions inventories and for monitor-
ing emissions . . .are problematic.' 78 The agency proposed full
approval for not only the San Joaquin program, 7 9 but all thirty-
four programs in California. 8 0
c. Environmental Groups and Citizens Take
Their Battle to the Courts
After the EPA fully approved the emissions control program,
environmentalists and citizens groups (petitioners) took their bat-
tle to the courts to contest the potentially illegal rule. In May
2002, the petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA's full ap-
proval of the San Joaquin program, arguing that the EPA had
shirked its non-discretionary duty to prohibit state programs that
fail to comply with the CAA.' 8 ' The petitioners argued that the
EPA is required to issue a SIP call for not just the San Joaquin
program, but for all of California pollution control district
programs. 182
ter Newell Letter] (commenting on the approval of the Title V Program for the San
Joaquin Valley).
175. Id. at 3-4.
176. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
177. See Newell letter, supra note 174, at 8.
178. CAA Full Approval, supra note 171, at 53152.
179. Id.
180. Clean Air Act Full Approval of 34 Operating Permits Programs in California,
66 Fed. Reg. 63503 (Dec. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
181. Settlement Agreement at 2-3, Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, No. 02-
70160 (9th Cir. 2002).
182. See id.
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d. EPA Responded to Threat of Suit; California
Responded to Threat of Losing Highway
Funding
The EPA had stated, in its proposal to fully approve the Dis-
trict's program, that it was appropriate to defer regulation of the
"limited" types of agriculture that fall within the exemption. 183
Upon receipt of the petition, however, the EPA fully changed
course, responding that California's programs are deficient, and
issuing a Notice of Deficiency, or "NOD," to all thirty-four of Cali-
fornia's air quality districts.18 4 The NOD stated that the agricul-
tural exemption "unduly restricts the local districts' ability to
adequately administer and enforce their title V programs," and
gave California ninety days to revise their programs.' 8 5 A year
later, the EPA issued a SIP Call stating that California's SIP was
"substantially inadequate."18 6 The SIP Call required California
"to amend its State law to eliminate the permitting exemption as
it pertains to major agricultural sources of air pollution" or risk
the loss of highway funding and prescribed offset sanctions. 187
Faced with the possibility of losing invaluable federal funding, the
California Senate quickly drafted and passed a bill to remove the
agricultural exemption, and by November 2003, the California
Health and Safety Code subsection 43210(e) had been repealed.18 8
The California example illustrated the great discontent citi-
zens felt in suffering from asthma and smog but lacking the tools
to stop those pollution problems. It also illustrated a remarkable
response to the threat of AFO emissions. Californians realized
that although the state had the world's strictest air emissions
standards for vehicles, its air quality problems would never be
fully addressed if the state allowed factory-style farms to operate
unfettered. Ultimately, the state imposed potentially costly emis-
sions requirements on AFOs despite California's need to sustain
its important farm economy.
183. See supra text accompanying note 178.
184. Notice of Deficiency for 34 Clean Air Act Operating Permits Programs in Cali-
fornia, 67 Fed. Reg. 35990, 35990 (May 22, 2002).
185. Id. at 35990-91.
186. Finding of Substantial Inadequacy of Implementation Plan; Call for Califor-
nia State Implementation Plan Revision, 68 Fed. Reg. 37746, 37746 (June 25, 2003).
187. Id. at 37747-48.
188. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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2. The Oregon Legislature is in the Process of
Removing a Similar Agricultural Exemption
a. Industrial Animal Agriculture is on the Rise
in Oregon
Although the state of Oregon has a fraction of the farming
economy of its southerly neighbor, 189 Oregon is not immune to pol-
lution from factory-style farming. California claims the country's
largest farming economy, but Oregon claims one of the country's
largest dairies-Threemile Canyon Farms, LLC (Threemile). 190
In total, Threemile Canyon currently has 52,300 cows, but is per-
mitted to expand to 90,667 cows.1 91
Before Threemile began operating, industrial animal agricul-
ture represented but a small sector of Oregon's agricultural make-
up. While some AFOs existed, family farming dominated the
state and has been increasing, unlike in most other states. 192 In
the last few years, however, factory-style farming in Oregon has
also been on the rise. Oregon has witnessed a dramatic increase
in industrial farming operations since 1994, including the addi-
tion of at least five poultry operations with between 300,000 and
600,000 animals, large-scale dairies, and feedlots. 193
b. Air Pollution is Also on the Rise in Oregon
Air pollution is also on the rise in Oregon. In 2005, the U.S.
Forest Service discovered acid rain in one of the state's most re-
189. Oregon's 40,000 farms reached a production value of $4.1 billion in 2004. See
Katy Coba, Director, Or. Dep't of Agric., Remarks to the Oregon Banker's Association
(Oct. 20, 2005), available at http:www.oregon.gov/ODA/news/do-speech_051020.
shtml. This is approximately sixteen percent of California's $25 billion farm economy.
190. Threemile Canyon Farms, LLC, Our Story: Growing the Northwest's Leading
Sustainable Farm, http://www.threemilecanyonfarms.com/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2007). Threemile itself claims to be one of the country's largest dairies, although some
sources claim that Threemile is the largest dairy in the country, or even the largest in
the world. These other sources should be cited or delete sentence as unneccssary.
Note also that Threemile's website advertises the dairy as a sustainable farm. Id.
While the operation has engaged in a number of sustainable farming practices, the
fact that Threemile emits pollution levels as indicated in this article strongly under-
cuts its claim to sustainability. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
191. Threemile Report, supra note 139.
192. Kendra Kimbirauskas, A Green Illusion at Threemile Canyon, OR. CONIFER,
Summer 2005, at 6. An impressive ninety-eight percent of Oregon farms are family-
owned. Or. Dep't of Agric., Oregon Agriculture: Industry Overview, AGRIC. Q., Winter
2004/2005, at 2.
193. Letter from Mark Riskedahl, Executive Dir., Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., to Michael
Bogert, Reg'l Adm'r, EPA Region 10 (Sept. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Petition to Revoke Oregon's SIP].
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nowned natural places-the Columbia Gorge.' 94 Protected by the
Columbia Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 195 the eighty-five mile
stretch of land carved out by the Columbia River possesses 800
species of wildflowers, sixteen of which exist nowhere else, and the
highest concentration of waterfalls in North America. 196 The
Gorge is also a historic site, explored by Lewis and Clark and
crossed by thousands of pioneers traveling the Oregon Trail. 197
Scientists have identified two likely sources of pollution con-
tributing to the acid rain: Portland General Electric's coal-burning
power plant and Threemile Canyon Farms, LLC (Threemile), both
located in eastern Oregon. 198 Threemile is estimated to generate
up to 2,829 tons of ammonia per year. 199 Using the emissions fac-
tor adopted by the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dis-
trict, Threemile also releases 505 tons of VOCs per year.200 Using
these figures, Threemile's emissions would also exceed the major
source threshold by five times the amount for VOCs and twenty-
nine times the amount for ammonia. Threemile's ammonia levels
also exceed the combined total of reported ammonia air emissions
from all of Oregon's industries.20 1
c. Citizens and Environmentalists Demanded
That the Exemption Be Removed
Despite the pollution plaguing the Gorge, the state's Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) lacks the tools to address
194. Michael Milstein, Tracking Acid in Gorge, OREGONIAN, July 29, 2005, at Al.
For information on the Gorge, see Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Our Mission and
Vision Statements, http://www.gorgefriends.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 544-544p (2000).
196. Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Columbia Gorge Overview, http:l
www.gorgefriends.org/gorge (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
197. Id.
198. Milstein, supra note 194, at Al.
199. See supra text accompanying note 139. Ammonia emissions of 5,657,500
pounds per year is equivalent to 2,829 tons per year.
200. Petition to Revoke Oregon's SIP, supra note 193. The emission factor is 19.3
pounds of VOCs per cow per year. Id.
201. See TRI Explorer, supra note 140 (under "Geographic Region," select "Ore-
gon"; under "Chemical Released," select "Select Specific Chemical(s)"; in new window,
choose "Ammonia" and click "Done"; then click "Generate Report"on on original web
page) (Oregon's industries required to report emissions under CERCLA and EPCRA
create a combined total of 1,292,444 pounds of ammonia. Threemile reported
5,675,000 pounds of annual ammonia emissions). See also discussion supra Part
IV.A. Note that the TRI figures include "point source" air emissions, also known as
"non-fugitive" emissions. The CAA does not generally regulate "fugitive" emissions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j).
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the problems. Like California until 2003,202 Oregon possesses an
express exemption from the state's air pollution laws for agricul-
ture. The head of the DEQ's air quality division admitted that
due to the exemption, "'[DEQ personnel] don't have the tools we
normally have to address the [pollution] situation."' 20 3 As in Cali-
fornia, citizens in Oregon demanded that the law be changed to
effectively deal with modern agriculture. In 2005, Northwest En-
vironmental Defense Center (NEDC), Friends of the Columbia
Gorge, Pacific Legal Advocacy Center (PEAC), and other citizen's
groups petitioned the EPA Region Ten to remove the agricultural
exemption.20 4 The citizens' groups argued that Oregon now pos-
sesses major sources of air pollution and that these sources must
obtain NSR or Title V permits from the DEQ in order to oper-
ate.20 5 The EPA directed the state to remove the exemption,20 6
and since then, the Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA), the
DEQ, representatives of the agricultural industry, and the citi-
zens' groups have been working to draft a new bill to eliminate the
agricultural exemption. 20 7 Oregon, like California, is demanding
that factory-style farms be treated like industrial sources under
the CAA.
V. THE EPA'S AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT -
AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE?
Scientific studies show the health threats from CAFO air
emissions. Judges have responded by requiring factory-style
farms to contribute to Superfund for the hazardous pollutants
they emit. Lawmakers in western states have responded by re-
202. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
203. Milstein, supra note 192, at Al.
204. See Petition to Revoke Oregon's SIP, supra note 193.
205. Id.
206. EPA Region 10 responded to Oregon petitioners' request in a more informal
way than EPA Headquarters did when petitioners in California requested the re-
moval of its exemption. EPA Region 10 did not issue Oregon a SIP call, but instead
communicated directly with the citizens' groups and the DEQ. Telephone Interview
with Melissa Powers, Clinical Professor, Pac. Envtl. Advocacy Ctr. (PEAC) at Lewis &
Clark Law School, in Portland, Or. (Jan. 26, 2007).
207. The ODA did not invite the citizens' groups to help construct the new bill.
Representatives from Oregon's agricultural industry, the ODA, and the DEQ drafted
a "legislative concept," which would remove the exemption, in the summer of 2006.
The legislative concept has been assigned a senate bill number, and is now "S.B. 235."
The state agencies invited the citizens' groups to comment on what is now S.B. 235,
and the citizens' groups created a stronger, alternative legislative concept. See Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr. et al., Agriculture and Air Quality Legislation Problems and Solutions
(on file with author).
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quiring regulation of CAFOs under the CAA. What is the EPA
doing to respond? At the turn of the twenty-first century, it ap-
peared that the EPA was beginning to take action. In 2001, in its
first ever suit against an AFO for CAA violations, the EPA
reached a $350,000 settlement agreement with Premium Stan-
dard Farms and Continental Grain Company, together the na-
tion's second largest producer of hogs. 208 In 2004, the EPA settled
a case against Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P., in which the corporation
was required to pay $880,598 in civil penalties and over $1.6 mil-
lion to implement emissions-reducing technology.20 9 The EPA en-
tered into a similar consent decree in 2006 with Seaboard Farms
LP, one of the largest vertically-integrated pork producers in the
United States. 210
With the exception of these few cases, the EPA has declined to
bring additional CAA suits against AFOs.211 What EPA has done
instead is announce a different initiative to address air emissions
from factory-style farms-the Air Compliance Agreement (Agree-
ment).212 Billed as an "extensive, nationwide emissions monitor-
ing study" of AFO emissions,"213 the Agreement's goal is "to
address emissions of air pollutants and hazardous substances
from certain animal feeding operations(s) that may be subject to
208. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Nation's Second Largest Hog Producer
Reaches Settlement with U.S. & Citizen's Group (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/psf.html (click on "Press Release").
In addition to the civil penalty, the defendants were ordered to spend an additional
$50 million to install emission-reducing equipment. Id.
209. The Department of Justice brought this action on behalf of EPA Region 5. See
EPA, Region 5 - Regional Counsel: Enforcement Action Summary Fiscal Year 2004:
Clean Air Act (CAA), http://epa.gov/region5/orc/enfactions/enfactions2OO4/law-
caa.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
210. See Press Release, EPA, Government Reaches Settlements with Seaboard
Foods and PIC USA (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/ compliance/
resources/cases/civil/mnseaboard.html (click on "Press Release").
211. While the above cases were originally initiated under the Clinton Administra-
tion, under the Bush Administration, no new CAA cases have been brought against
confinement operations. EPA Administrator, Christine Whitman, discouraged en-
forcement of polluting industries. See Elizabeth Shogren, A Natural Split with Bush,
and Many Quit: Longtime, Key Officials Who Favor Conservation Say They Are Frus-
trated by New Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at 1 (describing how an EPA attorney
quit after finding that Bush administration policies "affected her ability to vigorously
pursue cases in her specialty, concentrated animal feeding lots" and "the agriculture
industry's sway over the administration was making it increasingly difficult to crack
down on corporate farms").
212. Air Compliance Agreement, supra note 20, at 4958.
213. Id.
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requirements of the Clean Air Act [and CERCLA and EPCRA]".214
The Agreement sets forth an air emissions program in which
emissions from livestock confinement buildings and waste lagoons
will be monitored for a two-year period scheduled to begin in
2006.215 The EPA will use the monitoring data to establish meth-
odologies for estimating emissions from AFOs. 2 16
While this sounds like a positive step forward-EPA finally
recognizes what citizens, state legislators, and scientists already
know-a closer look reveals that it may not be. The specific de-
tails of the Agreement illustrate that the EPA remains content to
perpetuate the myth that AFOs are farms, not industrial sources.
This section illustrates why the Agreement is not an adequate re-
sponse to the pollution problems from factory-style farms.
A. The Agreement Unreasonably Delays Pollution
Reductions
Primarily, the Agreement is not an adequate response to air
emissions because it requires absolutely no reduction in AFO
emissions; the Agreement is merely another study. After the con-
clusion of the two-year monitoring program, the EPA has eighteen
months to analyze the data.21 7 At that point, the EPA will publish
"emission estimating methodologies" for AFOs, and AFOs partici-
pating in the program must certify that they are in compliance
with all CAA requirements. 218 After the methodologies are pub-
lished, AFOs have 120 days to implement the methodologies and
214. Id. at 4962. EPCRA is the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). Similar to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2000), it requires polluters to report hazardous emissions above certain
levels. 42 U.S.C. § 11004.
215. EPA, Civil Enforcement: Animal Feeding Operations Air Quality Compliance
Agreement Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/agreements/caa/
cafo-fcsht-0501.html#nationwide (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Although the monitor-
ing was scheduled to begin in 2006, as of January 2007, it had not yet begun. Tele-
phone Interview with Brent Newell, Ctr. for Race, Poverty and the Env't in S.F., Cal.
(Jan. 23, 2007).
216. EPA, supra note 215.
217. Press Release, EPA, EPA Takes Important Step in Controlling Air Pollution
from Farm Country Animal Feeding Operations (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http:/!
www.epa.gov/newsroomnewsreleases.htm (click on "Agriculture", then "EPA Takes
Important Step in Controlling Air Pollution from Farm Country Animal Feeding Op-
erations") [hereinafter EPA Press Release].
218. Air Compliance Agreement, supra note 20, at 4958.
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apply for applicable CAA permits. 219 Assuming that this timeline
is correct, the earliest date in which participating AFOs will be
required to actually control emissions is October 2010. However,
it could be much longer than that, as the Agreement also gives
AFOs an option to extend its deadline to comply "by mutual agree-
ment of EPA and participants, without limit to how long such an
extension might last."220
When people are suffering from serious respiratory and other
ailments from AFO emissions, the EPA is taking what appears to
be an unreasonable risk in delaying regulation. The EPA claims
that the monitoring study is necessary because the currently
available science about AFO air emissions is unclear. 221 First,
this is untrue; a number of studies have already been produced.222
Second, the CAA is a precautionary statute, and requires regula-
tion of pollution even in the face of uncertain science. In the
CAA's early history, legislative discussions surrounding the EPA
Administrator's decision to require decreased concentrations of
lead in gasoline reveal as much: "'Regulation later' as a regulatory
approach really means using humans as guinea pigs, and should
be considered socially unacceptable." 223 To delay regulation of an
entire industry known to emit substantial levels of dangerous pol-
lutants is to subvert the very precautionary essence upon which
the CAA was formulated.224
B. The Agreement Also Provides a "Safe Harbor" to
Agribusiness
1. The Agreement is an Incentive to Pollute
In addition to delaying regulation of AFOs for several more
years, the EPA's Agreement gives participating AFOs a "safe har-
219. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., AIR QUALITY
ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: EPA's AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT 5 (2005) [here-
inafter COPELAND, EPA's AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT].
220. Id.
221. Air Compliance Agreement, supra note 20, at 4958.
222. See, e.g., supra note 7.
223. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 46 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1124.
224. See, e.g., INDUR M. GoKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2001) ("It can also be argued that the
1970 Clean Air Act effectively operationalized the absolutist version of the precau-
tionary principle."). For more information about the precautionary principle, see Rob-
ert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
21 (2005-2006).
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bor" from air pollution liability.225 The EPA's Agreement is actu-
ally not just a monitoring plan, but also a promise to grant AFOs
immunity from enforcement of CAA violations. In exchange for
paying a small fine, AFOs that sign up to participate in the Agree-
ment receive a guarantee that the EPA will not sue the operations
for violations occurring before and during the Agreement, and an
additional period after the monitoring ends.226 A total of 6267
farms are participating in the project,227 but only thirty-six or
fewer of the participating AFOs will actually be monitored.228
While the thirty-six AFOs selected for monitoring have an incen-
tive to keep emissions low, the remaining 6231 participants have
a great incentive to pollute.229 Ninety-nine percent of AFOs na-
tionwide will essentially be off the hook from potential enforce-
ment until sometime after the study concludes.
2. The EPA Removes its Statutory Authority to Sue
for CAA Violations
The CAA gives the EPA Administrator the authority to sue
sources that do not comply with CAA emissions limits or other
pollution control provisions; "The Administrator shall, as appro-
priate . .. commence a civil action [against a major source] for a
permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a
civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for each violation
.... 230 In promising participating AFOs that it will not sue for
exceeding past or present emissions limitations, however, the
Agreement removes from the EPA its statutory authority to sue
sources for non-compliance with CAA provisions. Furthermore, it
225. COPELAND, EPA's AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT, supra note 219, at 4. The safe
harbor provision has received widespread criticism from environmentalists. See, e.g.,
Agreement Eases Fines for Farms That Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at A15
(quoting Ed Hopkins, environmental quality director for the Sierra Club, describing
the Agreement as a "'free ride on the backs of the public"'); Press Release, Sierra
Club, Sierra Club Response to EPA's Backroom Deal with the Meat Industry: State-
ment by Ed Hopkins, Environmental Quality Director (Jan. 21, 2005) (describing the
Agreement as "a get out of jail free card"); Press Release, Global Resource Action
Center for the Environment, Family Farmers Blast EPA's Sweetheart Deal with Meat
Industry (Jan. 21, 2005) (describing the Agreement as a "sweetheart deal [that] pro-
vides cover for polluters but will have residents paying through the nose").
226. COPELAND, EPA's AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT, supra note 219, at 4-5.
227. EPA Press Release, supra note 217.
228. COPELAND, EPA's AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT, supra note 219, at 4.
229. See id.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b). This amount rises with inflation, and the current penalty
maximum is $32,500. See 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 tbl. 1 (2006).
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is probable that the EPA will not bring suits against non-partici-
pating AFOs during the Agreement period.231
3. The EPA Removes the Power of the Citizen Suit
Furthermore, through the safe harbor, the EPA also makes
one of the CAA's most important regulatory tools-the citizen
suit-inapplicable to AFOs. Through the citizen suit provision,
the CAA provides citizens with a powerful tool to enforce the
CAA. 23 2 This provision is particularly useful and important when
agencies fail to enforce the Act for certain sectors, which appears
to be the case with industrial animal agriculture. The Agree-
ment's immunity provision, however, gives participating opera-
tions the guarantee that the EPA will not sue participants for past
violations. While the Agreement does not prohibit citizens from
suing participating AFOs, it does have the effect of preventing cit-
izen suits. It is unlikely that any court would find for the citizen
plaintiff against an AFO that had relied on the Agreement. 233
4. The EPA Already Has Authority to Monitor AFO
Emissions
Under the Agreement, the EPA will monitor emissions from a
few dozen participating AFOs. The CAA, however, already gives
the EPA Administrator the authority to require monitoring of any
polluting source; "[Tjhe Administrator may require any person
who owns or operates any emissions source ... to ... sample such
emissions .. ,"234 Since the EPA has the authority to monitor
AFO emissions without the Air Compliance Agreement, the moni-
toring program established by the Agreement is wholly
unnecessary.
5. Participants' Fines Are Unreasonably Low
Additionally, participating AFOs pay a fine based on the size
of the operation.235 Participants owning a single AFO, which is
231. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
233. See Brownfield Ag News for America, Webcast: EPA Clean Air Compliance
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.brownfieldnetwork.com/gestalt/go.cfrn?objectid=23509C
D7-DD1C-77FD-67A5AF7FOED5ADF6 (click on "Webcast: EPA Clean Air Compli-
ance Agreement" to listen to webcast) [hereinafter Air Compliance Agreement Web-
cast] (lawyer for National Pork Producers Council explains that signing up for the
Agreement would constitute a solid defense against any citizen suit).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(D).
235. Air Compliance Agreement, supra note 20, at 4966.
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not big enough to qualify as a CAFO, pay $200, participants own-
ing operations that do qualify as CAFOs pay $500 per farm, and
participants owning operations with "10 times the total number of
animals that defines the 'large Concentrated Animal Feeding Op-
eration' threshold" pay $1000 per operation. 236 Compared to the
civil penalties of up to $27,500 per day per each violation that the
EPA or citizens can request from violators of the CAA, a fine aver-
aging only $500 is unreasonably low and hardly an adequate en-
forcement technique. Agribusiness representatives themselves
refer to the penalty as being equivalent to a mere traffic violation
fine.237
C. Has Industrial Animal Agriculture Captured the
EPA?
It seems like the EPA has gone to great lengths to create a
monitoring system that it already had the power to require. Why
would the agency do this? The EPA calls the Agreement an "in-
centive for AFOs to participate."238 Perhaps this is true. How-
ever, it is more likely that the EPA has been "captured" by
industrial animal agriculture. Capture, sometimes called "inter-
est group theory" or "capture theory," is a term emerging from the
field of administrative law. 239 It refers to the process of adminis-
trative agencies making regulations based not on the public wel-
fare, but on "underlying private interests that are affected by
regulation."240
The EPA has been captured by the industries it regulates
before. In the mid-1970s, for example, Congress brought to the
public's attention the EPA's "capture by industry and its subver-
sion of congressional will at the expense of increased public health
hazards . . . ." when the EPA "relied on industry data in register-
ing pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act. '241 Also, in the early 1980s, Administrator Anne
236. Id.
237. Air Compliance Agreement Webcast, supra note 233.
238. EPA Press Release, supra note 217.
239. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 31
(10th ed. 2003) (quoting JERRY L. MASHAw AND DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY 7-10 (1990)).
240. Id. at 32.
241. Id. at 211 (quoting Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congres-
sional Oversight of EPA, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1991)).
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Gorsuch and other EPA officials were said to be entering into
"sweetheart deals" with industry.242
The formulation of the Agreement appears to be a result of
industrial animal agriculture's capture of the EPA because it was
written almost entirely by agribusiness representatives. As noted
earlier, the EPA issued a settlement agreement with Premium
Standard Farms in 2001. The agreement required the corporation
to conduct emissions monitoring, but provided that if the AFO was
found to exceed the major source threshold for emissions, Pre-
mium Standard would not be held to be in violation of the CAA for
past emissions.243 The AFO also was given a cure period to come
into compliance. 244 If this sounds strikingly similar to the EPA's
Agreement, that is because it is essentially the same principle,
only the EPA has applied it on a national scale. 245 Richard
Schwartz, the lawyer who represented Premium Standard Farms
in the EPA case and negotiated the settlement agreement, also
drafted the preliminary version of the EPA's Agreement.246
After Premium Standard, it seems the industrial animal agri-
culture sector grew nervous that enforcement actions would be ap-
plied to the entire industry. A coalition of agribusiness interests
soon formed, no other enforcement actions were brought, and after
three years of discussions between industry representatives and
the EPA, the Agreement was unveiled. 247 Citizens were never in-
vited to participate in these discussions.248 Knowing this makes it
242. Id. at 212.
243. See Consent Decree Between United States of America and Citizens Legal
Environmental Action Network, Inc. and Premium Standard Farms, Inc. and Conti-
nental Grain Company, Inc. I 64(a)-(b), Citizens Legal Envtl. Network, Inc. v. Pre-
mium Standard Farms, No. 97-6073-CV-W-6, Citizens Legal Envtl. Network, Inc. v.
Cont'l Grain Co., No. 98-6099-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. 2001) [hereinafter Consent Decree];
see also Air Compliance Agreement Webcast, supra note 233.
244. Consent Decree, supra note 242, 64(c); see also Air Compliance Agreement
Webcast, supra note 233.
245. Air Compliance Agreement Webcast, supra note 233 (Attorney for National
Pork Producers Council explains that applying the Premium Standard agreement on
a national scale was his idea).
246. Id. Richard Schwartz is a partner of law firm Crowell & Moring, LLP, and
serves as environmental counsel for the National Pork Producers Council. Id.
247. The Sierra Club reveals how livestock industry lobbyists essentially drafted
the Air Compliance Agreement for the EPA. See Press Release, Sierra Club, New Doc-
uments Show How Bush Administration Gave Meat Industry Control Over Factory
Farm Pollution Policy (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/press-
roomlcafo-papers/ (click on links to see emails between the EPA and lobbyists, a list of
agribusinesses participating in drafting the Agreement, and agribusiness's outline of
the Agreement).
248. See Press Release, Sierra Club, supra note 225.
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difficult to interpret the process in which the Agreement was
formed as anything other than the capture of the EPA by
industry.249
VI. A BETTER REGULATORY RESPONSE:
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE NOW
With solid evidence that AFOs are indeed on a par with in-
dustrial sources of pollution, the EPA should expend resources to
develop substantive compliance schemes under the CAA instead
of waiting several years to determine whether AFOs are worthy of
CAA regulation. If the EPA could unleash itself from the power of
agribusiness, it would likely find that the statutory authority al-
ready exists to regulate AFOs under the CAA. Introducing regu-
lation upon an industry that continuously resists regulation and
exerts considerable influence on the EPA is understandably
tricky. However, the regulatory world should know that the CAA
can presently regulate at least the bigger AFOs under its current
statutory authority, and a regulatory system can be developed
based on existing models.
A. Use Existing CAA Authority to Regulate AFOs
Under the CAA's current framework, factory-style farms can
be regulated. As shown in Part III, to fall under CAA regulation,
sources must be "major." Certainly some bigger AFOs meet this
threshold. Threemile, for example, not only meets it but is nearly
thirty times above the major source threshold for ammonia.250
Measuring emissions from factory-style farms is arguably more
challenging than measuring emissions from traditional "smoke-
stack" industrial sources, since AFOs lack smokestacks through
which all emissions escape. However, AFOs do possess exhaust
pipes attached to the confinement facilities, manure lagoons, and
pipes from which manure is spread onto the land, which would not
be terribly hard to measure. The EPA could presently regulate at
least the bigger AFOs using the major source threshold.
249. Citing the problem of capture and other issues, a coalition of environmental-
ists challenged the Agreement. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. U.S. EPA, No. 05-
1177 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. May 27, 2005). EPA has not yet submitted a response, but
the agency's reply brief is due February 9, 2007. Telephone Interview with Michele
Merkel, Senior Counsel, Envtl. Integrity Project, in Wash. D.C. (Jan. 25, 2007).
250. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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B. Tie CWA CAFO Permits to CAA Permits
1. The CWA Already Requires CAFO Regulation
Alternatively, instead of using the major source mechanism to
trigger regulation of AFOs under the CAA, the EPA could simply
link the CWA CAFO permit program to CAA regulation. The
CWA, as the lone federal regulatory of CAFO pollution, requires
all CAFOs to obtain NPDES permits. 251 Each state administers
its own NPDES permit program for CAFOs. 25 2 Under the pro-
gram, CAFOs must apply to the delegated state permitting agency
and if approved, the CAFO receives a permit, which allows it to
operate under specific terms and conditions. 25 3 CAFOs must cre-
ate waste management programs, for example, which explain how
the CAFO will effectively manage animal waste.254 Additionally,
CAFOs are required to measure, monitor, and report pollution
(mainly of animal waste) discharges. 255
2. The CWA Permit Program Could Be Linked to a
CAA Regulatory Program
Regulators have long advocated for a "multi-media" approach
to regulation. 256 It makes sense to combine regulation of air and
water pollutants, especially for sectors like animal agriculture,
where the presence of water pollution generally also indicates the
presence of air pollution. 257 The linking of CWA CAFO permits to
CAA permits would accomplish this innovative multi-media ap-
proach to environmental regulation.
Furthermore, a multi-media approach would be relatively
easy to accomplish for CAFOs. The CWA already regulates
thousands of CAFOs; 258 local pollution control agencies would not
251. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Natural Res. Div., Or. Dep't of Agric., Confined Animal Feeding Op-
erations, http://egov.oregon.gov/ODA/NRD/cafofront.shtml (last visited Jan. 14,
2007).
253. See, e.g., NATURAL RES. Div., OR. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OREGON CONFINED ANIMAL
FEEDING OPERATION GENERAL PERMIT NUMBER 1 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://
egov.oregon.gov/ODA/NRD/docs/pdf/cafo-gnlpmt.pdf.
254. Id. at 10 (Oregon's CAFO general permit).
255. Id. at 12-13.
256. See Marc Ribaudo & Marca Weinberg, Improving Air and Water Quality Can
be Two Sides of the Same Coin, AMBER WAVES, Sept. 2005, at 34, available at http://
www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/September05/Features/ImprovingAirandWater.htm.
257. See id.
258. See Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA, supra note 11, at 2
(stating that of the approximately 18,700 CAFOs in the United States, 8,100, or forty-
four percent, have NPDES permits).
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have to bring CAFOs under brand new regulation, but instead
simply add air pollution control requirements to existing CWA
CAFO permits. This approach would also alleviate the EPA's fear
of regulating the entire farm universe, which, as J.B. Ruhl points
out, is "a daunting prospect."259 While linking the CAFO CWA
permit program to air pollution regulation would only regulate
CAFOs, and not all 450,000 AFOs across the nation, it would cer-
tainly bring the worst polluters of industrial animal agriculture
under CAA regulation.
C. Use Idaho's New Scheme as a Model
Another alternative would be for the EPA to follow some of
the innovative air pollution control techniques that have emerged
from western states. Idaho, for example, has developed a creative
solution to deal with the problem of excessive ammonia emissions
from dairies. In 2004, the Idaho Conservation League (ICL) sued
owners of a dairy outside of Jerome, Idaho for failing to obtain a
CAA permit for ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and particulate mat-
ter emissions. 260 The result of the suit was the creation of a
rulemaking clarifying Idaho dairies' obligations to comply with
the CAA.26 1 The rulemaking, know as a "Permit by Rule" (PBR),
was developed jointly by representatives of the dairy industry in-
cluding the Idaho Dairymen's Association and the Milk Producers
of Idaho, environmental groups such as the ICL, and state agen-
cies including the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA)
and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ).262
Under the PBR, dairies that emit over one hundred tons of
ammonia per year are automatically subject to a permit, which
includes pollution control requirements. 263 Each dairy's emis-
sions are calculated using a formula based on the number of
animal units and type of manure collection system used, and dair-
ies meeting the threshold must register with the DEQ and imple-
259. Ruhl, supra note 50, at 329.
260. Idaho Conservation League v. Boer, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1212-13 (D. Idaho
2004).
261. Telephone Interview with Bill Eddy, Attorney, Advocates for the West, in
Boise, Idaho. (Oct. 15, 2006).
262. See Idaho Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Air Quality: Permit by Rule for Dairy Farm-
ers, http:www.deq.idaho.gov/air/permits-forms/permitting/pbr -dairies.cfm (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2007) (click on "Rules for the Control of Ammonia from Dairy Farms" to
see rule).
263. Id.
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ment certain best management practices (BMPs).264 Each BMP is
assigned a value, and dairies have the flexibility to choose which
BMPs they will use, as long the BMPs add up to twenty-seven
points.265 The EPA could consider a similar PBR and implement
Idaho's strategy nationwide, for not just dairies, but all AFOs. 266
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that AFOs (including CAFOs, the
larger AFOs) are major sources of air pollution, and should be reg-
ulated as such under the CAA. The pollutants that factory-style
farms emit are dangerous-some are even listed as hazardous
under CERCLA. Controlling emissions from waste lagoons, con-
finement facilities, and land is necessary in order to reduce health
problems such as respiratory disease, and environmental
problems including acid rain, smog, and global warming.
Scientific studies clarify the dangers of AFO emissions, and
citizen and environmental groups, judges, and legislators have re-
sponded with pleas to reduce the pollution threat of industrial
animal agriculture. However, the EPA seems content to allow
AFOs to continue to operate unfettered for several more years,
under the ruse that more scientific studies are necessary to deter-
mine the real threat. The EPA's answer, the Air Compliance
Agreement, is full of problematic provisions and is potentially ille-
gal. The Agreement subverts the precautionary spirit inherent in
the CAA, and does little more than illustrate that industrial agri-
culture has captured the EPA in its influential grip.
The EPA currently possesses the statutory authority in the
CAA to regulate AFOs, and the agency could easily model a new
regulatory scheme on existing CAFO regulatory programs. Ad-
mittedly, the regulation of industrial animal agriculture is bound
to be a difficult process, especially because the agribusiness lobby
is powerful and unwilling to be regulated. However, there is no
excuse for delaying regulation in the face of a dangerous pollution
threat. The EPA, the agricultural industry, and the public must
come to understand that at some point a farm stops being a farm,
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. The PBR is not a perfect solution to dairy emissions, and in fact has been
criticized for being too weak. Telephone Interview with Bill Eddy, supra note 260.
The EPA should examine Idaho's PBR to learn how to strengthen such a scheme for
implementation on a national scale.
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and starts being an industrial operation. At this point, exemp-
tions are inexcusable, and delay is unconscionable. Failure to reg-
ulate is simply hogwash.
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